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Based on experimental data, we study how repetition of a statement affects perceived 
statement credibility. We identify two counteracting effects: The first effect, known as “truth 
effect”, describes a positive relationship between repetition and statement credibility. People 
tend to ascribe higher credibility to messages that they repeatedly encounter. In contrast, the 
second effect occurs when repetition is taken too far. Here, an indirect and negative effect is 
identified and participants start to perceive the message as a persuasive attempt. This 
perception triggers reactance, which in turn, considerably reduces participants’ trust in the 
source and leads to a significant decrease in the overall credibility of the message. Our results 
broaden the understanding of the benefits and harms of repeated persuasive messages. 
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Helpful or Harmful? How Frequent Repetition Affects Perceived Statement Credibility  
Frequent repetition of persuasive messages is a common strategy to create attention for 
and convince others of one’s arguments. Nonetheless, the “effects of repeated exposure to 
persuasive communications [is] an area that has generated surprisingly little research by social 
psychologists despite its frequent occurrence in and importance to everyday life“ (Cacioppo 
& Petty, 1979, p. 97). Although Cacioppo’s and Petty’s conclusion dates back more than 30 
years, we still do not know much about the persuasive effects of message repetition. Research 
so far has mainly focused on repetition effects on attitudes (Zajonc 1968; Bornstein, 1989) 
and credibility (Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977; Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 
2010). In both cases, positive relationships have been observed: Repeating persuasive 
messages yields more favorable attitudes and increases credibility.  However, repetition may 
also have negative effects, if it exceeds a certain threshold, resulting in an inverted U-shaped 
relationship. Although this pattern has been observed in several studies (e.g. Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1979; Saegert & Jellison, 1970; Zajonc, Shaver, Tavris, & Van Kreveld, 1972), there is 
still a lack of research explaining its causes, especially regarding persuasive stimuli. 
In the present article, we examine the impact of multiple repetitions of persuasive 
messages on statement credibility and expect two counteracting effects. For one, we assume a 
direct, positive effect of repetition on statement credibility: Recipients often have to rely on 
heuristics when assessing whether a message is true or not and consider whether the 
respective statement appears familiar (Arkes, Boehm, & Xu, 1991; Arkes, Hackett, & Boehm, 
1989; Parks & Toth, 2006; Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Roggeveen & Johar, 2002). This 
familiarity heuristic occurs unconsciously and is influenced by the frequency of a statement 
being perceived: Repetition increases familiarity and leads to the (false) assumption of having 
heard the statement in a different context before, which subsequently enhances belief in the 
statement (Hasher et al., 1977). In cognitive psychology this process is known as the “truth 
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effect” and has been empirically confirmed under various experimental conditions and 
therefore can be considered a stable phenomenon (Dechêne et al., 2010). 
Secondly, we assume that repetition triggers an indirect and negative effect causing a 
decrease of statement credibility: Repeating a statement might be interpreted as a persuasive 
attempt, which could evoke reactance (Moyer-Gusé, Jain, & Chung, 2012). Reactance in turn 
might exert a negative effect on source credibility and therefore may lead to lower levels of 
statement credibility. Hence, we expect two contradictory effects of statement repetition: a 
direct increase of statement credibility (truth effect), and an indirect decrease of credibility 
evoked by reactance.  
  
Increased credibility of statements through repetition: The truth effect 
The repeated perception of a statement increases a person’s subjective impression that 
the statement is true (Hasher et al., 1977). This is due to two different processes: First, 
recipients misattribute the source of the statement. Repeated perception leads recipients to 
mistakenly believe that they have heard the statement before from different sources (Arkes et 
al., 1991; Arkes et al., 1989; Roggeveen & Johar, 2002; Schwartz, 1982). Over the course of 
socialization, people learn to more readily believe statements which originate from numerous 
independent sources (Arkes et al., 1991; Brown & Nix, 1996). These ‘other’ sources are 
considered to be validating points of reference, enhancing statement credibility. 
The second process is based on repetition induced familiarity with the statement itself. 
The repeated encounter of a stimulus increases its “processing fluency”: The information can 
be processed more easily with every additional perception (Bornstein, 1989; Reber, 
Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998; Seamon et al., 1995). Enhanced processing fluency leads to a 
feeling of familiarity: People consider statements which are, for instance, easier to read (e.g., 
due to color contrast or large font sizes) to be more familiar and, in turn, more credible as 
compared to statements which are more difficult to read (Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Unkelbach, 
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2007). The feeling of familiarity finally leads to higher subjectively perceived statement 
credibility (e.g. Parks & Toth, 2006; Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Unkelbach, 2007; Unkelbach, 
Bayer, Alves, Koch, & Stahl, 2011). 
The magnitude of the truth effect depends on several factors, such as recipient 
characteristics. Prior knowledge about the specific subject is of particular importance: The 
truth effect is weaker or absent when recipients are confronted with statements about which 
they have no prior knowledge (Arkes et al., 1989; Boehm, 1994; Koch & Zerback, 2012). 
Furthermore, involvement moderates the truth effect (Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992; Begg, 
Armour, & Kerr, 1985; Hawkins & Hoch, 1992). Low levels of involvement lead to an 
increase in the strength of the truth effect (c.f. the metaanalysis of Dechêne et al., 2010), 
whereas a minimum or baseline level of involvement is required to evoke it (Hawkins & 
Hoch, 1992, p. 222).  
In addition to recipient characteristics, specific stimulus characteristics influence the 
strength of the truth effect. It weakens and even diminishes if the answer to the respective 
statement is too obvious. For example, people will not accept a statement like, “The earth is 
flat”, even if it is repeated several times (Roggeveen & Johar, 2002). Accordingly, the truth 
effect is strongest when participants are uncertain about a statement’s validity (Unkelbach, 
2007). However, the time lapse between repetitions plays a negligible role regarding the 
strength of the truth effect; it appears to make little difference whether minutes (Begg & 
Armour, 1991; Hawkins, Hoch, & Meyers-Levy, 2001; Koch & Zerback, 2012; Schwartz, 
1982), or even weeks (Bacon, 1979; Gigerenzer, 1984; Hasher et al., 1977) have elapsed 
between statement repetitions. In fact, the effect does not diminish before three weeks have 
passed after the last exposure (Arkes et al., 1991). The occurrence of the truth effect also 
appears to be independent of statement type; it has been observed in various domains, such as 
factual knowledge statements (e.g., Bacon, 1979; Schwartz, 1982), advertising slogans (e.g., 
Hawkins et al., 2001; Johar & Roggeveen, 2007; Roggeveen & Johar, 2002), and expression 
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of opinions (Arkes et al., 1989). In addition, it occurs regardless of how a statement is 
presented, be it, for instance, a graphical (Hawkins & Hoch, 1992) or oral presentation 
(Gigerenzer, 1984; Hasher et al., 1977). Although most studies in the truth effect have been 
conducted in the laboratory, it has also been observed in natural settings (Boehm, 1994). 
The focus of the present study is on the number of presentations of a given statement. 
Most studies repeat the respective statement just once or twice. Yet only few studies have 
analyzed how a high frequency of presentations affects the assessment of a statement’s 
perceived validity. Hasher et al. (1977) presented slogans three times and observed only a 
slight increase in perceived credibility
1
 after the last measurement. A similar pattern was also 
observed by Gigerenzer (1984). Arkes et al. (1991) tested the effect with a total of six 
presentations of the same statement. Again, a significant increase in perceived credibility was 
observed only between the first and the second measurement. Yet, in all studies mentioned 
above, at least one week had passed between the presentations of the statement. So the 
question remains what would happen to the truth effect if the time lapses between the 
statements were shorter? Hawkins et al. (2001) presented a statement (here: an advertising 
claim) four times within one hour. Credibility increased considerably after the first repetition 
and only marginally after subsequent repetitions, leading the authors to conclude that “the 
biggest boost comes from one prior exposure” (Hawkins et al., 2001, p. 9). Koch and Zerback 
(2012) used six presentations within only a few minutes and found that credibility increased 
until the third presentation, whereas repeating a statement six times weakened the effect. 
In conclusion, previous research shows that after the third or fourth statement 
presentation, the truth effect either weakens or no longer occurs at all. How can these effects 
of frequent presentation of the same message be explained theoretically? There are several 
models focusing on the effects of repetition of persuasive communication on attitude change 
(e.g. Berlyne, 1970; Cacioppo & Petty, 1979, 1989). Fink and Cai (2013) e.g. discuss in their 
discrepancy models of belief change assumptions and implications for message repetition on 
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belief positions (see also Kaplowitz, Fink, Armstrong, & Bauer, 1986). Depending on the 
number of repetitions and “the ratio of the change achieved by a message […] to the change 
advocated by the message”, the authors discuss various effects (Fink & Cai, 2013, p. 88). 
According to the discrepancy model, repetition causes recipients either (1) to move 
successively toward the position advocated or (2) the belief position oscillates due to message 
repetition with damping alternately overshooting and undershooting the position advocated or 
(3) message repetition causes the belief positions to move increasingly away from the position 
advocated (p. 87-88). Yet, the discrepancy model focuses in particular on belief-position 
dimensions and not on the psychological processes that might cause a decline in statement 
credibility.  
Koch and Zerback (2012) argue that presenting a statement too often may evoke 
reactance working against the truth effect. Likewise, Miller (1976) suspects that presenting 
statements too frequently triggers reactance. He demonstrated that moderate exposure to 
posters with political slogans enhanced participants’ attitudes towards the message, whereas 
overexposure dampened positive attitudinal effects. Although both studies explain their 
findings in terms of reactance, reactance itself was not measured. The authors’ conclusions 
regarding reactance are, therefore, post hoc interpretations. To date, the extent to which 
reactance counteracts the truth effect remains unclear, both from theoretical and empirical 
perspectives. 
 
Decreased credibility of statements through repetition 
The previous paragraphs show that multiple repetition of a statement can reduce its 
credibility – but what are the processes underlying this effect? We assume that recipients 
interpret frequent repetition as a persuasive tactic and thus as a persuasive attempt. Friestad 
and Wright (1994) refer to this process as activation of persuasion knowledge, which means 
knowledge of persuasive strategies as well as intentions. Recipients have gained this kind of 
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knowledge in the course of their socialization (Friestad & Wright, 1994). Whether or not 
people recognize the persuasive intent depends on various factors. For example, recipients are 
more likely to recognize a persuasive attempt when they are attentive and have sufficient 
cognitive resources available (Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; Williams, Fitzsimons, & Block, 
2004), when the communicator’s persuasive intention is explicitly communicated, or when 
they are forewarned by contextual information (McGuire & Papageorgis, 1962; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1977). In addition, whether recipients perceive a persuasive intent is influenced by 
stimulus characteristics: The more conspicuous the persuasive character of the stimulus, the 
more likely it will be identified as an attempt at persuasion (concerning brand placements, e.g. 
Cowley & Barron, 2008; Matthes, Schemer, & Wirth, 2007; Schemer, Matthes, Wirth, & 
Textor, 2008). Recipients recognize an attempt at persuasion for example when “messages 
[…] create the perception, that the source was trying ‘too hard’ to sell his case, make only one 
side of the issue salient, create the perception of extreme bias on the part of the source” 
(Smith, 1977, p. 198). It is precisely these associations with persuasive intents that a high 
frequency of statement repetition should generate. A very high repetition frequency might 
draw recipients’ attention to the persuasive intent of the communicator. From a certain point 
on, repetition is not disregarded or dismissed as merely incidental, but rather identified as a 
persuasive tactic, which leads to H1: There is a positive relationship between the number of 
presentations of a statement and the perceived intent to persuade. 
Identifying persuasive intentions has a range of consequences. In the course of 
socialization, recipients not only learn to recognize persuasive attempts, but also how to deal 
with them; these are typically characterized as defensive reactions (Friestad & Wright, 1994). 
J. W. Brehm (1966; 1972) argues that the identification of an attempt at persuasion is 
perceived as a threat to freedom (cf. also Kohn & Barnes, 1977; Reinhart, Marshall, Feeley, & 
Tutzauer, 2007; Worchel & Brehm, 1970). When individuals experience barriers and 
constraints that restrict their freedom, they become uncomfortable and react aversively 
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(Burgoon, Alvaro, Grandpre, & Voulodakis, 2002; Wicklund, 1974) since they do not want to 
be forced to choose a certain alternative. If a person’s freedom is threatened, restricted, or 
lost, the person wishes to restore it; this motivation is known as reactance (J. W. Brehm, 
1966; S. S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Moyer-Gusé and Nabi (2010) as well as Moyer-Gusé et 
al. (2012) demonstrate that recognizing persuasive intentions triggers reactance. In line with 
these theoretical and empirical findings, we also maintain that the recognition of an attempt at 
persuasion results in increasing reactance: There is a positive relationship between a 
perceived intent to persuade and the recipient’s reactance (H2). 
Reactance has various consequences, which can be differentiated into behavioral and 
subjective effects (J. W. Brehm, 1972; S. S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Behavioral effects are 
manifested in either direct or indirect restoration of the threatened or revoked freedom. Direct 
restoration takes place, for instance, when an alternative is chosen even if it is obstructed or 
revoked; indirect restoration means that an individual performs a related behavior to the threat 
(J. W. Brehm, 1966, p. 10). In this study, we do not focus on the effects of statement 
repetition on behavior, but on the subjective effects caused by reactance (J. W. Brehm, 1972; 
S. S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Reactance can negatively affect the perception of the 
communicated content (LaVail, Anker, Reinhart, & Feeley, 2010; Meirick & Nisbett, 2011). 
When recipients show reactance, they often strengthen an attitude contrary to the intention of 
the communicator (S. S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Besides its negative effects on the 
perception of the communicated content, reactance also affects source perception (Meirick & 
Nisbett, 2011; Quick & Bates, 2010). In this respect, studies especially observe negative 
effects on source credibility (Grandpre, Alvaro, Burgoon, Miller, & Hall, 2003; C. H. Miller, 
Lane, Deatrick, Young, & Potts, 2007; Quick & Bates, 2010). We therefore assume that 
increasing reactance results in a decrease in the perceived message credibility (H3a) as well as 
source credibility (H3b). 
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Ultimately, the perceived credibility of the communicator affects, in turn, the 
perceived credibility of his or her message (Begg et al., 1992). Numerous studies have shown 
that credible communicators have a greater influence on attitudes than communicators who 
are less credible (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Hovland & Weiss, 1951). Accordingly, we 
expect a positive relationship between a communicator’s perceived credibility and the 
statement’s credibility (H4). 
The relationships described in the previous paragraphs between a) the number of 
statement repetitions, b) perceived intent to persuade, c) reactance, d) trust in the 
communicator, and e) statement credibility, constitute a complex interdependency, as depicted 
in Figure 1 (H1–H4). First we expect an indirect negative effect of repetition on statement 
credibility. The result of increasing repetition frequency should be that recipients become 
aware of the attempt at persuasion and develop reactance, in turn leading to a reduction in the 
overall credibility of the statement (directly, or indirectly due to the communicator’s 
decreasing credibility).  
These expected effects stand, however, in opposition to the truth effect, according to 
which recipients are more likely to believe a statement that is repeatedly presented to them 
(Dechêne et al., 2010; Hasher et al., 1977). Thus finally, we expect a positive relationship 
between the number of statement presentations and its perceived credibility (H5). To 
conclude, statement repetition should lead to two simultaneously occurring, but contradictory 
effects: To a direct increase of statement credibility (truth effect), as well as to an indirect 
decrease of credibility evoked by reactance. 
 
Figure 1  
Theoretically postulated relationships between statement repetition frequency and statement 
credibility 






We conducted an experiment to test our hypotheses with volunteers recruited in 
seminars and lectures. Altogether, 167 subjects participated in the study (115 female, 52 
male). The average age was 26.41 years (SD = 9.17); 87% of the participants had achieved a 
higher education entrance qualification. Participants were randomly assigned to one of five 
groups, which did not significantly differ in terms of gender, χ2 (4, N = 167) = 0.44, p = .98, 
age, F(4, 161) = 1.83, p = .18, and education, χ2 (8, N = 167) = 7.58, p = .48. 
 
Stimulus 
Participants read a newspaper article of about 600 words in length. On average, it took 
just less than three minutes to complete reading (median, 196 seconds). The first paragraph 
explained the principle of microcredit loans (in the amount of approximately 100-200 dollars) 
that are given to poorer population segments of emerging nations, serving as start-up capital 
for microenterprises. The second section of the article consisted of an interview with 
Muhammad Yunus, who is considered to be the founder of the microcredit loan system. We 
used a shortened version of an original interview. Participants were told that the purpose of 
the study was to evaluate the quality of the interview; after the survey, participants were 
debriefed and provided with the link to the original article. 
The number of presentations of the statement that ‘microcredits reduced poverty in 
emerging nations’ served as our independent variable. We produced five versions of the 
interview, which were identical except for message frequency. The control group (CG) did 
not receive the statement. The experimental groups read it either once (EG1), three (EG2), 
five (EG3), or seven times (EG4). The wording of the statement was slightly modified in each 
version in order to appear more authentic (e.g. “And it turns out that microcredit loans have 
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already significantly decreased poverty in emerging nations”; “Still, in emerging nations, 
microcredit loans have already reduced poverty considerably”). Such minor variations in the 





We measured participants’ assessments of statement credibility by asking (on a 5-
point Likert scale) whether they believe the following three claims to be right or wrong: 
“Microcredit loans have reduced poverty in emerging nations”, “Microcredit loans have 
considerably decreased poverty in emerging nations”, “Microcredit loans have markedly 
reduced poverty in emerging nations” (α = .92, M = 2.54, SD = 0.91). To distract respondents, 
we mixed these three items with buffer items that referred to attitudes towards microcredit 
and development aid and distributed all questions randomly across two sets. 
 Perceived intent to persuade 
Using the following two items, we checked whether the participants realized that they 
were exposed to an attempt at persuasion (5-point Likert scale): “I had the feeling that Mr. 
Yunus wanted to convince the reader of his standpoint”; and “Mr. Yunus wanted to convince 
me of his views” (α = .88, M = 3.95, SD = 0.98).  
Reactance 
To measure reactance, we relied on the one-dimensional reactance scale developed by 
Herzberg (2002). We only used items that we considered relevant to our design, as the general 
disposition to reactance was not of interest. The three selected items (again, on a 5-point 
Likert scale) were: “Mr. Yunus tried to restrict my personal freedom of choice”; “It bothers 
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me that Mr. Yunus presented himself as a role model”; and “I would really like to disagree 
with Mr. Yunus” (α = .79, M = 2.23, SD = 0.96). 
Communicator credibility 
Finally, we examined perceived source credibility by using items that ask for 
perceived expertise and trustworthiness (Hovland et al., 1953; Hovland & Weiss, 1951).
2
 
Expertise refers to the communicator’s ability to make valid statements about a particular 
topic, whereas trustworthiness refers to the “degree of confidence in the communicator’s 
intent to communicate the assertions he considers most valid” (Hovland et al., 1953, p. 21). 
We used a semantic differential (5-point scale), that included four pairs of adjectives: 
dishonest–honest, untrustworthy–trustworthy, qualified–unqualified and insincere–sincere (α 




Testing our hypotheses poses particularly demanding requirements for the chosen 
method of analysis. On the one hand, the method must be able to mathematically distinguish 
both direct and indirect effects of the independent variable. On the other hand, the 
relationships in question should not only be established between observable variables, but also 
between constructs (latent variables).
3
 For this reason, we used a linear structural equation 
model that fulfills both criteria (Cheung & Lau, 2008; Holbert & Stephenson, 2003). Zero-
order correlations of all constructs included in the model are presented in Table 1. Figure 2 
shows the relationships between the five constructs found on the basis of our experimental 
data. 
Table 1   
Zero-Order Correlations  
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Figure 2   
Observed Structural Equation Model  
The empirical data confirm the theoretically hypothesized relationships between the 
individual variables. The model presented in figure 2 reveals an acceptable overall model fit 
(Holbert & Stephenson, 2002; Hu & Bentler, 1999): χ² = 72.95, df = 50, p = .02; SRMR = .08; 
RMSEA = .05; CFI = .98.
4
 All calculations were performed using Mplus software. 
With a single exception (see below), all standardized path coefficients are statistically 
significant
5
 and point in the expected direction, supporting the validity of our theoretical 
assumptions. Presenting a statement more often does significantly increase the probability that 
participants identify the stimulus material as an attempt to persuade
6
, β = .29, p < .001. This 
confirms H1 and, in theoretical terms, fulfills the first key requirement for the simultaneously 
occurring indirect effect of repetition. In addition, it is important to determine whether a 
perceived attempt at persuasion leads to reactance on the part of the recipients. This 
relationship is also confirmed by the data, β = .38, p < .001. We therefore see H2 confirmed 
as well. We further assumed that reactance should lead to a loss of trust in the communicator 
(H3b) and should also directly affect the assessment of the statement itself (H3a). However, 
reactance does not exert a significant negative effect on statement credibility, β = -.10, p = 
.43. H3a is therefore rejected. However, reactance negatively influences communicator 
credibility, β = –.71, p < .001, which confirms H3b. Finally, the indirect path is completed by 
a strong correlation between communicator credibility and statement credibility, β = .51, p < 
.001. The more credibility participants ascribe to the communicator, the more likely they are 
to believe that microcredit loans have reduced poverty in emerging nations. Thus, H4 is also 
confirmed. 
In addition to the indirect ramifications, repetition frequency also yields a positive 
effect on perceived statement credibility, β = .17, p < .05. This is in line with earlier findings 
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on the truth effect, as well as with H5. The more often a person reads the statement 
“microcredit has reduced poverty in emerging nations” in the newspaper article, the more 
likely he or she believes it. 
The evidence of a positive direct effect and a negative indirect effect raises the 
question which of the two would ultimately predominate. The model clearly depicts the direct 
effects of repetition, expressed by the coefficient of the path from repetition to statement 
credibility, βdir = .17, p < .05. The indirect effect, however, has to be calculated by 
multiplying the coefficients along the indirect path, βind = –.05, p < .01.7 Finally, the total 
effect of repetition frequency is obtained by subtracting the indirect from the direct effect, βtot 
= .12, p = .09. This shows that the negative indirect effect of repetition almost completely 
diminishes the positive direct effect. 
Statistically, the findings constitute a suppression effect. Suppression means that a 
correlation which is initially absent is revealed after controlling for mediating variables 
(Conger, 1974). In our case there was no correlation between repetition frequency and 
statement credibility to be found when the indirect path was excluded from the structural 
equation model, β = –.03, p = .67. It is communicator trustworthiness that, in the end, explains 
a considerable part of variance with regard to statement credibility. The remaining 
unexplained variance is positively correlated with repetition frequency, which explains the 
significant path coefficient in the overall model.
8
 
The suppression issue is worth of additional attention. We considered reactance as a 
key variable within the model. However, one could argue that reactance is not essential in 
terms of mediating the relationship between repetition and statement credibility, since 
participants might downgrade statement credibility simply because they would realize the 
communicator’s intent to persuade. To test this alternative explanation, we computed two 
additional models. Within the first, we freed the path ranging from “perceived persuasive 
intent” to “statement credibility”, β = -.03, p = .68, to account for a possible direct effect. In 
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the second model, we added a path between “persuasive intent” and “communicator 
credibility”, β = -.11, p = .15, to see whether participants’ trust in the communicator decreases 
without them being reactant. In both models, the respective path coefficients were not 
statistically significant and model fit did not improve (model 1: χ² = 72.78, df = 49, p = .02; 
SRMR = .08; RMSEA = .05; CFI = .98; model 2: χ² = 70.72, df = 48, p = .02; SRMR = .08; 





This study was motivated by earlier findings on the truth effect, suggesting that the 
credibility of a statement increases if it is repeated, but weakens or even reverses with more 
frequent repetition (Hawkins et al., 2001; Koch & Zerback, 2012). We were able to replicate 
these findings and demonstrated that repetition indeed increases statement credibility. In 
addition, our study broadens the theoretical and empirical understanding of the truth effect by 
providing an explanation for its decline after a certain number of repetitions. Our analysis 
shows that an indirect effect, counteracting the truth effect, is triggered by frequent repetition. 
The key variable in this process is reactance, resulting from identifying repetition as a 
persuasive tactic. Contrary to previous studies, citing reactance ex post facto as a possible 
cause for the decline of statement credibility after frequent repetition, our study incorporates 
reactance as an analytical construct. Reactance is triggered by the perceived intent to 
persuade: Recipients imply that the communicator tries to persuade them. In keeping with J. 
W. Brehm (1966) that recipients will consider attempts at persuasion to be restrictions of their 
freedom, a perceived intent to persuade evokes reactance. 
We also accounted for two potential consequences of reactance, namely on perceived 
statement credibility and on communicator credibility (Meirick & Nisbett, 2011; Quick & 
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Bates, 2010). Contrary to our expectations, reactance does not directly decrease statement 
credibility, but yields an indirect effect by decreasing communicator credibility. This suggests 
that reactance, triggered by a recognized attempt at persuasion, can lead to differentiated 
cognitive assessments, as subjects do not necessarily devaluate both message and source.  
Limitations and implications 
The results presented are limited in various respects. The first aspect relates to the 
stimulus: The finding that reactance only affected communicator credibility might be due to 
the fact that within an interview the interviewee is in the focus of reader’s attention and 
therefore held responsible for the frequent repetition. A second stimulus related limitation 
concerns the repetition density: while the triple repetition of a statement seems plausible in 
the context of a 600-word printed interview, repeating a statement five or seven times might 
be considered as rather artificial. Still, the stimulus has to be seen in light of the study’s main 
goal, which was not to achieve external validity in terms of a realistic amount of repetitions, 
but to explain the truth effect’s decline after a certain number of presentations. It was 
therefore necessary to successively increase frequency of statement exposure to a 
considerable level. 
Furthermore, external validity is restricted because participants were aware of the 
experimental situation. Although we did not reveal the objective of the study, participants 
probably were still more attentive than in an everyday situation and thus more likely to notice 
attempts at persuasion. Regarding the degree of reactance, also the type of message might be 
relevant. One might assume e.g. that the correlation between perceived intent to persuade and 
reactance might be lower when people expect an attempt at persuasion (i.e., advertising) than 
when the persuasive intention is concealed. 
It should also be mentioned that the model as such can prove causality only to a 
particular extent. Strictly speaking and according to experimental logic, only the two paths 
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directly linked to our independent variable (presentation of the statement) can be interpreted 
in a causal manner, whereas causal interpretation of the other four relationships follows only 
from theoretical considerations. 
Finally, there are certain limitations inherent to measuring reactance. While the 
‘creators’ of reactance theory (Brehm & Brehm, 1981, p. 37) conclude that the construct has 
the status of an intervening, hypothetical variable which cannot be measured directly (thus, 
the only way to assess the presence of reactance would be to infer it from its effects, e.g. by 
measuring attitudes or behavior), research now suggests “that it is possible to use a 
combination of self-report cognitive and emotional measures to create a more or less direct 
index of reactance” (Dillard & Shen, 2005, p. 160). Dillard and Shen (2005, p. 162) also 
express implications for assessing reactance induced by persuasive messages and conclude 
that reactance can be measured using self-report techniques and that anger as well as negative 
cognitions should be assessed. The items we used in our study are taken from the 
“psychometric ambiguous reactance scale”, developed by Herzberg (2002); it measures anger 
as well as negative cognitions, similar to the composite index of anger and negative 
cognitions developed by Dillard and Shen. Yet, we did not use the thought listing technique to 
measure cognitive responses and their four-step sequence coding. Thus, follow-up studies 
could solve this problem. Also our data solely relates to the reactance caused by the 
communicator. It may also be possible that the participants experienced reactance towards the 
journalist, who allows (or fails to prevent) such frequent repetition of the statement in the 
interview. These potential effects were not controlled for.  
Future research directions 
In addition to rectifying the problems discussed above, future studies could 
particularly address the influence of context factors on the observed negative effect of 
repetition frequency. This may include, for instance, the lapse of time between stimulus 
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presentations. Thus, if a statement would be presented even more often, reactance might be 
weaker or set in later if more time passes between presentations. The extent to which counter-
arguments or counter-statements affect the truth effect has also not been addressed in previous 
studies. Many situations involving repetition of persuasive messages are characterized by 
counter-arguing or contradiction in general (as e.g. included in televised debates, discussion 
panels, interpersonal networks, or internet forums). The manner in which contradiction affects 
the truth effect may be a fruitful endeavor for future research. 
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1
 These findings, however, remain fairly descriptive, as the authors do not report the 
significance between individual measurements but only the significance of the main effect. 
2
 In addition to these dimensions, research on source credibility has also pointed to further 
dimensions, for example, attractiveness, perceived similarity between recipient and 
communicator, dynamism, sympathy, and social acceptance (Baseheart & Bostrom, 1972; 
Berlo, Lemert, & Mertz, 1969; Berscheid, 1966; Brock, 1965; Giffin, 1967; Horai, Naccari, & 
Fatoullah, 1974; Patzer, 1983; Snyder & Rothbart, 1971; Whitehead, 1968). However, these 
are only of importance when no other information about a source is available, and are best 
considered as reinforcers (O'Keefe, 2002, pp. 181-191). Expertise and trustworthiness, on the 
other hand, are the only dimensions found in nearly all analyses. 
3
 In confirmatory factor analyses, constructs are presented within structural equation models, 
taking means measurement errors into account. In this way, the quality of the analysis is 
further increased. 
4
 The minimum sample size required for a study using a structural equation model depends on 
the number of observed and latent variables, the desired probability and statistical power 
levels, and the anticipated effect size. We used an algorithm developed by Westland (2010, 
pp. 481-482) to compute the minimum sample size required. According to this algorithm and 
accounting for the structural complexity of our model, the recommended minimum sample 
size is 100 participants. 
5
 The conclusions inferred to within the scope from the structural equation model are based on 
the assumption of multiple normally distributed variables (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004, p. 
11); this assumption is usually (and also in the case of this study) violated. The bootstrap 
procedure represents a conventional way of dealing with the violation of this premise. It refers 
 
HELPFUL OR HARMFUL      31 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
to a re-sampling method in which a large number of random samples (here: 10.000) is drawn 
from the original sample (Elfron, 1979, 1987). In this respect, the sample in this study must be 
considered a quasi-population from which the random sample N is drawn. The distribution of 
various population parameters created this way provides considerably more reliable 
confidence intervals than other, conventional significance tests (Byrne, 2001, pp. 267-286; 
Yung & Bentler, 2003). 
6
 Measurement models using only two manifest indicators are underidentified, meaning that 
the information provided by the data is not sufficient to estimate model parameters. A 
possible solution for this problem is to simply use an index consisting of the two indicators as 
a substitute for the latent variable. However, that way a major advantage of structural 
equation modeling is lost – namely the possibility to account for measurement errors. We 
therefore followed an alternative approach offered and tested by Stephenson and Holbert 
(2003) called Latent Composite Structural Equation Modeling. It allows researchers to use 
latent variables consisting of only one manifest indicator which itself is an index of two or 
more manifest variables. Mathematically the path from the latent construct to the observed 
variable is fixed to 1.0 and the error variance of the observed index is fixed to (1 – reliability) 
x indicator variance. In a monte carlo simulation Stephenson and Holbert (2003) showed that 
LC models yielded parameter estimates that were more reliable than those in models using 
only observed variables (pp. 335-336). 
7
 Multiplying the coefficients of the indirect effect does, however, lead to the corresponding 
product being normally distributed only in exceptional cases. As a consequence, conventional 
significance tests that require a normal distribution of the data in question can lead to distorted 
results. For this reason, a corrected bootstrap technique (BC bootstrap), which is adjusted for 
such distortions, is employed in this study (Cheung & Lau, 2008; Holbert & Stephenson, 
2003; MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004). 
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8
 We also checked whether the missing correlation between repetition and statement 
credibility in the simple bivariate model is due to a non-linear character of this relationship 
(inverted U). To do so, we added a quadratic term to this model (repetition²) as an 
independent variable. If the relationship follows an inverted U, one would expect the 
quadratic term to have a significant negative regression coefficient – which was the case (β = 
-.64, p < .05). Model fit: χ² = 2.75, df = 4, p = .60; SRMR = .02; RMSEA = .00; CFI = 1.00. 
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Table 1   
Zero-Order Correlations  
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Number of presentations –     
2. Statement credibility –.03 –    
3. Perceived intent to persuade .25** –.16* –   
4. Reactance .36** –.35** .30** –  
5. Communicator credibility –.34** .48** -.28** –.61** – 
**p < .01; *p < .05 
 
  














Figure 2  Observed Structural Equation Model 
***p < .001; **p < .01 
Note. All significance tests were calculated by means of bootstrapping (10.000 samples). The 
confidence intervals of the indirect effects are corrected for distortions that could arise from 
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